Building upon writings of William James, Pierre Janet, Jacques Lacan, Sigmund Freud, and others, we here examine the history of three metaphors and their relation with the evolution of key ideas in psychological theory, aiming to illustrate to what extent epistemic heterogeneity characterizes scientific inquiry more broadly. Such heterogeneity, often unawarely taken on board, may include not only metaphysical assumptions and social constructions, but also the extensive adoption of metaphors as means to validate theories, guide inquiries and help imagine new possible worlds. The concepts of trauma, memory and unconscious are taken into account as bridging empiricism and the theory of meaning. We hereby outline their role in validating scientific statements around hysteria, on the liminal field between philosophy and science. Following the general orientation outlined by Lakoff & Johnson, Danziger and Reynolds, we investigate how the validity conditions of numerous scientific statements are deeply embedded with the truth of the metaphors and analogies historically adopted to formulate their model-based reasoning.

Received 27 April 2026. Revised 06 May 2026. Accepted 30 May 2026. Published online 06 July 2026

Epistemology, Metaphors, Philosophy of Medicine, Psychology, Psychiatry, History of Ideas,