This paper follows the dispute over the role of intuition and reason in ethics throughout the history of the discipline. It moves from Socratic intellectualism and Aristotle's account of character formation, through medieval debates on will and conscience and the early modern conflict between rationalists and sentimentalists, to nineteenth-century challenges from utilitarianism, evolutionary theory, and the genealogical critiques of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. It closes with twentieth-century developments in empirical moral psychology. This review refers to the dual-process framework, which distinguishes between Type 1 and Type 2 processing. Moral attitudes are relatively stable evaluations. They tend to produce quick, affective responses without deliberation. Moral norms, by contrast, are clear and expressible statements about what is required, forbidden, or permitted. Attitudes fit fast, automatic Type 1 judgments, while norms guide slower, more reflective Type 2 thinking. However, internalized norms can become increasingly automatic over time, and sustained reflection can reshape attitudes. The paper concludes that intuition and reason are not competing sources of moral truth, but complementary ways of processing the same moral content.

Received 21 January 2026. Revised 08 February 2026. Accepted 16 February 2026. Published online 20 February 2026

Moral intuition, Moral reasoning, Dual-process theory, History of ethics, Moral psychology, Moral norms, Moral attitudes, Moral evaluations, Moral judgments,